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This paper analyses the link between lobbying, market structure, growth, and welfare. We consider a setup 
where lobbyist firms undertake contributions to a policy-maker in exchange for profit increasing 
regulations, in a general equilibrium model of R&D driven growth. We find that, despite increasing 
concentration – which leads to higher prices and less varieties – lobbying may stimulate growth and 
increase welfare by means of an expansion in aggregate demand if its real costs are small. This 
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 The Politics of Growth:




This paper analyzes the link between lobbying, market structure, growth, and
welfare. We consider a setup where lobbyist rms undertake contributions
to a policy-maker in exchange for prot increasing regulations, in a general
equilibrium model of R&D driven growth. We nd that, despite increasing
concentration|which leads to higher prices and less varieties|lobbying may
stimulate growth and increase welfare by means of an expansion in aggregate
demand if its real costs are small. This conclusion is supported by a simple
calibration exercise.
JEL Classication: D72, L13, O31.
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This paper models and explores the link between lobbying, market structure, growth,
and welfare. Contrary to the remaining literature on the subject, lobbying is modeled
explicitly, and not exogenously addressed through a lobbying technology. We consider
a R&D driven growth model where the free-entry equilibrium is not Pareto ecient|
a possibility that has already been discussed in the literature (Jones and Williams,
2000, de Groot and Nahuis, 2002). This framework leaves a role for lobbying, since
the introduction of another distortion in an economy initially characterized by one or
more distortions may positively aect eciency and well-being, as posited by Lipsey
and Lancaster (1956-57). We then show that lobbying increases market concentration
relative to free-entry, is most likely to increase innovation and growth, but may or
may not increase welfare. The key feature of the model is that lobbying erects barriers
to entry; lower competition increases the return of one unit of R&D, thus leading to
more innovation and higher growth. However, it also increases the mark-up pricing
and decreases the number of varieties, thus having an ambiguous impact on welfare.
Most importantly, the change in welfare depends on the real resources that are lost
due to lobbying.
Lobbying has recently become a multi-billion dollar industry in the U.S., totaling
3.49 billion dollars in 2009 according to the Center for Responsive Politics.1 Ev-
ery year, special interest groups|corporations, industry groups, labor unions, and
single-issue organizations|spend billions of dollars to lobby the Congress and federal
agencies, in an attempt to induce policy-makers in power to pay attention to their
issues and in
uence decision making. In addition, billions of dollars are also spent
by these special interests in campaign contributions every two years, when federal
campaigns are held and elections to the Congress take place. For the 2008 elections,
these amounted to 2.34 billion of U.S. dollars. Contributors expect that money trans-
fers incurred during political campaigns are repaid back latter by the beneciaries,
in the form of favorable legislation, less stringent regulations, political appointments,
government contracts, or tax credits, just to name a few. A large fraction of these
expenditures is made by rms. As Djankov et al. (2002) point out, politicians can
use regulations to create rents for incumbent rms, which can thus be extracted
through lobbying, campaign contributions, or even bribes. These regulations may
include, for instance, administrative burdens to register a business, legal barriers to
1Data available on-line at http://www.opensecrets.org.
1entry, non-transparent rules for penetrating a market or discrimination against for-
eign rms, as noted by Grossmann and Steger (2008). A key question is whether
R&D-intensive industries spend more money in lobbying and are more concentrated
than other industries. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the U.S. phar-
maceutical industry spent over 250 million dollars in lobbying, and the computers
and internet industries about 120 million, in 2009. Figure 1 provides a more gen-
eral picture, and shows that the relationship between average lobbying expenditures
and average R&D is likely to be positive. Grossmann and Steger (2008) also register
some evidence of anti-competitive activities in R&D-intensive industries, reporting,
for instance, that most current regulations impede competition in the pharmaceutical
industry in Switzerland. These authors have also established (theoretically) an unam-
biguously negative relationship between R&D and the number of entrants, suggesting
that R&D-intensive rms engage in anti-competitive behavior by lobbying politicians
to increase the cost of market entry.2 A dierent perspective is provided by Aghion
et al. (2005), who have established, both theoretically and empirically, an inverted-
U relationship between competition and innovation. However, they do not consider
lobbying.
It is generally acknowledged in the literature that most rent-seeking activities have
baneful implications, not only over economic growth, but also over welfare. In the
pursue of prots, most rms undertake a variety of actions, such as lobbying, tax
evasion, litigation, corruption, or even theft, which are individually protable, but
wasteful from the society's perspective. These activities are described by Baumol
(1990) as \unproductive entrepreneurship," since they have the knack of reducing the
set of resources applied on the real side of the economy, cutting down production,
slowing down growth, and depressing welfare. However, as Grossmann and Steger
(2008) argue, this is not necessarily the case for lobbying in R&D-intensive industries.
In their paper, investing in entry barriers and in R&D are complementary activities,
which may lead to an increase in growth and welfare. To illustrate their argument,
they analyze the growth performance of South Korea. In this country, the product
market is highly regulated, highly concentrated, and R&D intensity is as high as
in the U.S.. It is believed that these characteristics were an important source of
economic growth in the last 4 decades. To summarize, there is suggestive evidence
that R&D-intensive industries spend more in lobbying, that those expenditures may
2On the opposite direction, several empirical studies (e.g. Blundell et al., 1999, Nickell, 1996,
Geroski, 1995) found that innovation increases with competition.







































Figure 1: Scatter plot of lobbying on R&D.
The gure plots average lobbying on the x-axis against average R&D on the y-axis, but does not
show outliers for scale reasons. Each point represents an industry-year, from 2002 until 2009. The
data on R&D were collected from Bloomberg and matched with that on lobbying, collected from the
Center for Responsive Politics (http://www.opensecrets.org). The scatter plot shows all industries,
and not only R&D intensive industries. The line represents a simple OLS regression with no controls.
aect market structure, and that growth and welfare may change as a result.
We build on the general equilibrium framework of Peretto (1996), and consider an
oligopolistic market with an endogenous number of rms, each producing a dieren-
tiated good and undertaking in-house R&D that generates higher quality products.3
These rms also participate in the political market. Here, we follow the classical
contributions on electoral competition and special interest politics by Austen-Smith
(1987), Baron (1994), and Grossman and Helpman (1996), and consider an oce
motivated policy-maker, who realizes that, in order to win elections, both votes and
money are needed.
3To our knowledge, the link between market structure and R&D dates back to Schumpeter (1942).
Applications to economic growth, however, are more recent. Peretto (1996) is the rst to explore
the linkage between market structure and innovation in the growth context.
3This approach can be motivated in two ways. In the rst, rms jointly form a
lobby which represents their interests in the political market. This analysis follows
Barnett (2006), Schuler et al. (2002), and Mizruchi (1989), who point out that rms
may benet from collective action, and has empirical support in Ozer and Lee (2009),
who found no evidence for preference for individual action over collective action from
R&D-intensive rms. The lobby uses the political market to attain what cannot be
attained in the economic market, due to anti-trust regulations|the maximization
of the joint prot of its members.4 Hence, we consider that the policy-maker and
the lobby bargain over the number of R&D licences (or the number of active rms),
making a case of \licences for sale."5 This is the interpretation in which we focus
throughout the paper. In the second interpretation, the legislator or policy-maker
denes directly the level of competition, by imposing an upward limit on the number
of licenses granted. Any given rm who wants to invest in R&D is compelled to make
cash transfers to the decision maker. Obviously, one can see this as a market for
R&D licences in exchange for bribes (where the government is a monopoly supplier,
as in Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).6 A direct application of these arguments to economic
growth can be found in Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007), who consider that rms
must acquire permits from corrupt public ocials in order to pursue their private,
growth enhancing activities.
We begin with a partial equilibrium analysis, where we show that, if the policy-
maker regards contributions as \suciently important," lobbying induces a decrease
in the number of active rms as compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium. This policy
may be growth enhancing, since the larger amount of prots to be disputed among
rms may increase the value of one unit of R&D. However, the impact on welfare is
negative, due to the increase in the mark-up pricing and the reduction in the number
of varieties. We then move to a general equilibrium framework, where we let prots
be paid back to households. Lobbying, by creating positive prots (that free-entry
would have eliminated), generates extra income to households|dividends|therefore
4In addition, several empirical studies (e.g. Hart, 2003, Alt et al., 1999, Taylor, 1997) have shown
that R&D-intensive rms invest more in political action.
5This last expression is inspired in Grossman and Helpman (1994), who have used the expression
\protection for sale" to illustrate how politicians are willing to grant trade protection for domestic
rms in exchange for political support.
6There is also a vast literature (for instance, Ades and Di Tella, 1999) emphasizing the relationship
between market structure and corruption; and in particular Bliss and Di Tella (1997) observe that
bureaucrats can directly limit the level of competition within the market in order to extract large
levels of surplus, by creating regulations that limit the entry of new rms.
4increasing the size of aggregate demand. Besides the direct impact on consumers'
welfare, the increase in aggregate demand raises rms' incentives to invest in R&D,
since the market size they can capture becomes larger. These adjustments balance
against the negative eects of a reduction in the number of varieties, the increase in
the mark-up pricing, and the real costs of lobbying, and hence the eects of lobbying
on welfare are ambiguous.
One interesting byproduct of our analysis is the following. If lobbying improves
welfare, then the free-entry equilibrium must be associated with some type of market
failure, otherwise it would be Pareto ecient. This represents the negative externality
on the returns to R&D imposed by entry. Since the gains from extra competition|a
lower mark-up and a larger number of varieties|may not suce to counterbalance
the fall in the growth rate, the free-entry equilibrium may be characterized by excess
entry. By restricting entry into the market, lobbying prevents a signicant fall in the
value of R&D, allowing the economy to correct, at least partially, this market failure.
In this sense, lobbying acts like a patent, increasing the incentives to innovate. This
comes at a cost, however|lobbying absorbs real resources that could have been used
elsewhere.
Finally, we calibrate the model for the U.S. economy. For our benchmark cali-
bration, the model predicts that lobbying results in a long-run growth rate about 0:4
percentage points higher as compared to free-entry. Whether welfare increases or not
depends on the real costs of lobbying, which are directly related to contributions.
Related literature
Our paper joins two branches of literature: R&D based endogenous growth models
featuring a relationship between market structure and innovation, and rent-seeking.
While original models of R&D based growth (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995,
Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Romer, 1990) left market structure out of the analysis,
recent papers (e.g. Peretto and Smulders, 2002, Vencatachellum, 1998, Smulders and
Van der Klundert, 1997, Peretto, 1996, 1998, 1999a,b) have considered the interaction
between innovation and market structure in models of endogenous growth. We build
on Peretto (1996), since the absence of transitional dynamics and some particular
features of his model allow us to introduce lobbying in an intuitive and tractable
framework.
Classical works on the eects of rent-seeking on economic performance include
Baumol (1990), Bhagwati (1982) and Krueger (1974). More recently, some atten-
5tion has been devoted to the relationship between rent-seeking and technology adop-
tion (e.g. Bellettini and Ottaviano, 2005, Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1996, Parent and
Prescott, 1994, Murphy et al., 1991). The bottom line of these models is that rent-
seeking erects barriers to technology adoption, hindering growth or leading to cycles
of stagnation and growth. Some authors (Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2007, An-
geletos and Kollintzas, 2000) have also considered the eects of rent-seeking on R&D
based models of endogenous growth, but they impose a constant market structure and
model the political market through a standard rent-seeking technology|a black-box
approach. Bliss and Di Tella (1997) consider the interaction between rent-seeking and
market structure, but do not address growth issues.
Recently, Brou and Ruta (2007) have studied the eects of rent-seeking on growth
and welfare, in a R&D based model of endogenous growth endowed with an endoge-
nous market structure. However, their results depend on a rent-seeking technology
whereby rms lobby the government in exchange for contributions, which are nanced
by taxing consumers.7 Moreover, the government in their model is a black-box which
translates rent-seeking eorts into subsidies.
The article by Grossmann and Steger (2008) jointly analyzes the decisions of
incumbent rms to invest in R&D and to lobby policy-makers to raise the rivals'
(entrants) entry costs. They show that investing in entry barriers and R&D are
complementary activities for incumbents, that lead to a decrease in the number of
entrants. The resulting change in the economy's growth rate and welfare due to lob-
bying depends on the degree of knowledge spillovers. However, their model does not
address any aspect of the political market, since it simply assumes that rms can
make anti-competitive investments that restrict the number of entrants according to
an exogenous technology. Moreover, the eects of a change in market structure on the
behavior of rms|and consequently on growth and welfare|are not present, since
there is only one incumbent rm per industry at all times.
Our paper diers from these literature in several directions. Firstly, we consider
only one specic form of rent-seeking: lobbying/contributions. This restriction allows
us to focus on the interaction between policy-makers and lobbyists, instead of assum-
ing an exogenous rent-seeking technology|that is, we open the black-box. Secondly,
our results depend on the real resources that are lost due to lobbying, and these are
the outcome of a bargain between the lobby and the policy-maker. Finally, we give a
7This structure is designed to capture the eects of lobbying at the European level, since in the
European Union organizations often receive nancial support from the European Commission, while
in the American system money 
ows in the opposite direction, from the private to the public sector.
6special emphasis to the eects of lobbying on the determinants of welfare. In particu-
lar, we consider the eects of a change in market structure on the mark-up pricing and
the number of varieties, and analyze how this adds to the direct eects of innovation
on growth and welfare.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section presents the
benchmark model. Section 3 presents the goods market. Section 4 analyzes the
free-entry equilibrium|our benchmark case. Section 5 introduces lobbying and puts
forward the main results of the paper. In Section 6 we undertake a calibration exercise.
Section 7 discusses our results and concludes.
2 The benchmark model
The model is set in continuous time. The (closed) economy is populated by a mass
of 1 innitely-lived and identical consumers; each of whom supplies inelastically one
unit of labor. There are N > 1 oligopolistic rms;8 each of whom supplies one variety
of a dierentiated good using the available technology, and invests in Research and
Development (R&D) in order to improve its state-of-the-art product.9
2.1 The demand side: consumer behavior






















8In the main analysis we consider the number of rms, N, as a discrete variable, since our results
below rely on strategic interaction between rms. However, in some steps N will be treated as a
continuous variable, since this greatly simplies the algebra of the model.
9Contrary to Peretto (1996, 1998), who considers cost-reducing technological progress, here, for
convenience, we assume that rms invest in quality improvements over their state-of-the-art product.
These two specications are, however, formally equivalent (Spence, 1984, Tirole, 1988), so all our
results carry through to the cost reduction case.
10This specication is used for analytical tractability and relaxed in Section 6, where we consider
a CRRA utility function.
7where  > 0 is the discount factor, R() =
R 
t r(s)ds is the average interest rate
from time 0 to , D and A are per capita dividends and assets, respectively, and w
stands for the wage rate. Finally, E denotes per capita expenditures and C stands
for consumption. In the analysis below, we measure all variables in terms of the wage
rate, and therefore set w = 1.
Let PC denote the price index of consumption, with the property E = PC C. The




= r    (1)
Consumers aggregate goods, xi, characterized by the state-of-the-art quality index,











where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between two dierent varieties. Note that




pi  xi (3)
Given the time path of expenditures in (1), the individual demand schedules can be
found by maximizing (2), pre-multiplied by the price index PC, subject to (3). This












represents the market share captured by rm i. We normalize the starting quality
level to unity, and so qi(t) = 1; 8i. As consumers are identical and population is
normalized to one, the demand faced by each rm is equivalent to the individual

















For later reference, note that the price elasticity of demand is (pi;qi) = "   ("  
1)S(pi;qi) and the quality elasticity of demand is (pi;qi) = ("   1)[1   S(pi;qi)].
2.2 The supply side: technology
Each rm produces output with technology
LXi = Xi +  (5)
where Xi is the output produced by rm i that is sold to households, and LXi is labor
used in production. The parameter  > 0 is a xed and sunk cost of production, which
can be interpreted as the labor required to keep the rm running. Lobbying policy-
makers requires an amount of labor LQi, endogenously determined. This represents
the output produced by rm i that is used to buy the required licences to operate a
business, therefore corresponding to in-kind contributions made by the rm. It can
also be interpreted as the real cost of lobbying, since it is associated to production
that is diverted from households. We discuss this interpretation in Section 7.
The rm's quality stock, qi, which determines the quality embedded in the state-
of-the-art product, is directly related to the rm's knowledge, zi, according to qi = z
i,
where  is the elasticity of quality with respect to R&D investment. The parameter
zi evolves according to








= Lzi  Zi (6)
where _ zi is the number of new patents produced in d units of time by a rm employing
Lzi units of labor in R&D. This technology exhibits overall increasing returns to scale
and constant returns to scale in knowledge. The productivity in the R&D sector is a
linear combination of both private and public knowledge, with 
 2 (0;1) determining
the share of private research that becomes publicly available.12
12As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), one can think that, when an innovator brings a new
product into the market, researchers can costlessly disassemble and study all its attributes, and this
knowledge can be readily used by rms to develop new blueprints, increasing the productivity of
R&D by 
.
9We assume, as in Peretto (1996), that knowledge diuses across rms as workers
move from one rm to the other. This implies that all rms have the same level of
knowledge at all times, and so the equilibrium will be symmetric.
2.3 Free-entry and lobbying







where instantaneous prots are
i = pi  X
D(pi;qi)   (LXi + Lzi + LQi)
through the choice of a price strategy, pi, and a R&D strategy, Lzi, subject to the
technological constraints (5) and (6), and total demand (4), taking as given the number
of rms, and the competitors' pricing strategies and R&D investments. For simplicity,
we consider that entry entails zero costs and rms do not have any scrap value.
As in Peretto (1996), we consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium in open loop
strategies. Accordingly, at time t rms commit to a time-path strategy in prices and
R&D investment, while free-entry and exit or lobbying negotiations determine the
equilibrium number of rms. Hence, we analyze a one-shot game played at t, which
denes the future behavior of all variables in the economy.13
We compare the economy's growth rate and the present value of welfare under
laissez-faire with the levels that prevail with lobbying. Under laissez-faire, i.e., when
the government has no in
uence over market structure and there is free-entry, entry
and exit decisions determine the equilibrium number of rms. Hence, in equilibrium,
instantaneous prots must be zero. With lobbying, negotiations follow a two stage
process and take place at t, before rms commit to a time-path strategy and interact in
the economic market. In the rst stage, an ecient bargain between the policy-maker
and a lobby, comprising all active rms, determines the equilibrium market struc-
ture. In the second stage, an asymmetric Nash bargain determines the distribution
of surplus between the policy-maker and the lobby, and consequently LQi.
Taking the temporal horizon of the policy-maker to be the same as the remaining
13Considering feedback strategies would be more realistic because they are subgame perfect, but
it is impossible to solve the model in that case.
10economic agents, and assuming an identical discount factor, the utility of the policy-
maker is
u













where 	()  0 is the total amount of instantaneous contributions. To keep the
model tractable, we only consider contribution schedules that are steady over time,
i.e., 	() = 	. Since transitional dynamics are absent from the model and market
structure is determined at t, only the knowledge of the present value of contributions,
and not their distribution over time, is needed to solve the model. The rst part of
(8) is the utility of the representative individual multiplied by the weight the policy-
maker assigns to the welfare of voters.14 This formulation is common in the literature
(Grossman and Helpman, 1996, Austen-Smith, 1987) and captures the intuition that
both popular policies and money are needed to win elections. Campaign contribu-
tions can be used to in
uence voters' perceptions about candidates' positions (either
through media and political debates, or by increasing the collection of information).
The weights are a simple shortcut to represent more complex scenarios as, for exam-
ple, political transparency or the level of democracy (Aghion et al., 2007), the number
of uninformed voters who are highly responsive to campaign expenditures (Grossman
and Helpman, 1996, Baron, 1994), or the number of swing voters who are highly
responsive to changes in platforms by political parties (Person and Tabellini, 2000).
The second part of (8) can also be interpreted as the response of the policy-maker to
an instantaneous lobbying expenditure of 	(). Figure 2 summarizes the interactions
between agents in an economy with lobbying.
3 The goods market
We rst analyze the equilibrium under laissez-faire. The political market is reintro-
duced in Section 5. The current value Hamiltonian for the rm's problem is
H
cv
i = (pi   1) 
ESi
pi








14As all individuals are identical, the utility of the representative individual can be thought of as














Figure 2: Diagram with the interaction between economic agents.
where the co-state variable, i, measures the value of a marginal unit of knowledge,
i.e., the value of the patent. The rm's knowledge capital, zi, is the state variable,
and R&D investment, Lzi, and the price, pi, are the control variables.






where i is the price elasticity of demand dened previously. The optimal R&D
strategy when 0 < Lzi < 1 implies that the marginal revenue from one unit of R&D
matches its marginal cost








= i  Zi (10)














where i is the quality elasticity of demand introduced previously. Equation (11)
states that the rate of return of a riskless asset equals the return of the R&D project
undertaken by the rm. Using the price strategy (9) and condition (10), (11) simplies
to










12Finally the transversality condition
lim
!1
i()  zi()  e
 R() = 0
states that, at the end of the planning horizon, the rm's knowledge has no value.
3.1 The symmetric equilibrium
As in Peretto (1996), we focus solely on the symmetric equilibrium. Let the variables







=   (N)  Lz (13)
where the new term (N) = [1 + 
(N   1)] represents the productivity of a R&D
project applying one unit of labor. Note that (N) is increasing in N, re
ecting the
positive R&D externality. Since the free-entry condition determines the equilibrium
number of rms at each moment in time, prots are instantaneously eliminated by
costless entry/exit. Following our previous notation, Z = (N)z, and hence we have
_ Z=Z = _ z=z. Dierentiating equation (10) with respect to time, using condition (13)
and the facts Z=z = (N) and S = 1=N in a symmetric equilibrium, the no-arbitrage




   [1 + 
(N   1)]   
(N   1)  Lz (14)
where the price and quality elasticities of demand are respectively
 = "   ("   1)
1
N
and  = ("   1)
N   1
N
Equation (14) allows us to identify the determinants of average R&D investment,
and consequently economic growth. The term E=N represents the gross-prot eect,
and is simply the gross prot of the rm for a given market share. The term  is
the business-stealing eect, and captures the increase in market share due to quality
increasing R&D.16 Spillovers also have two distinct eects over R&D productivity,
working on opposite directions. On the one hand, rms realize that their own R&D
15For simplicity, we omit some variables dependence when they are not relevant for the analysis.
16This terminology is based on Peretto (1996, 1998).
13generates spillovers, which makes their competitors more productive. This is captured
by the term  
(N   1). On the other hand, rms also benet from the spillovers of
other rms, which contribute positively to their productivity, by the amount 
(N 1).

















delivering the optimal individual investment in R&D as a function of the number
of rms, N, aggregate demand, E, and the interest rate, r, for an interior solution.
The relationship between average R&D and the number of rms is analyzed in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. Average R&D, Lz, is hump-shaped in the number of rms.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
While the gross-prot eect implies that the returns to R&D are decreasing in N,
since a higher number of rms entails a decrease in the market share and in the mark-
up, which are translated into lower prots and hence lower incentives to invest in
quality upgrades, the business-stealing eect implies that rms are willing to invest
more as N increases, as the potential gain in market share due to R&D becomes
higher. The business-stealing eect dominates when there are few rms, as the total
amount of market prots that can be appropriated through R&D is higher, while the
gross-prot eect predominates when N is large, because the amount of prots that
can be captured through quality improvements becomes lower. This conclusion holds
regardless of the spillover eects.
The following lemma analyzes the relationship between aggregate R&D, Lz(N;E;r) =
NLz(N;E;r), and the number of rms.
Lemma 2. Aggregate R&D, Lz, is hump-shaped in the number of rms if and only if
the interest rate is suciently low.


















can only take a negative sign for N large if the latter term does not dominate the
former; otherwise Lz is increasing everywhere in N. Intuitively, as the number of rms
14grows large, R&D resources are spread across too many rms, who then decrease their
R&D investments as they become unable to exploit economies of scale. The reduction
in average R&D only osets the increase in the number of R&D projects for suciently
low values of the interest rate.









In order to eliminate perverse eects of N on aggregate prots, we assume that the



















This assures that aggregate prots are decreasing in N, greatly simplifying the analysis
below. This also implies equilibrium uniqueness with free-entry.
3.2 Growth and welfare
The growth rate in this economy is determined by the growth rate of consumption.
Plugging in x = E (  1)=(N) in the consumption index (2), taking the logarithm,







+ logq() + logE(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which gives us the growth rate as a function of the number of rms in the market,
N, expenditures, E, and the interest rate, r. In this economy, growth depends on
how the average quality of all available brands evolves through time and on the usual
intertemporal trade-o faced by consumers. Before proceeding, it is worth noting
the determinants of average quality growth. The term 1 + 
(N   1) captures the
productivity of one unit of labor in a R&D project undertaken by the average rm,
15and is composed of two eects: the direct eect on the quality of the product developed
by the rm, and the positive R&D externality. This latter eect is increasing in N,
since a higher number of rms allows the economy to appropriate a larger amount
of spillovers. The term Lz=N captures the resources applied to improve the average
brand of the economy. The following lemma analyzes the shape of the growth rate.
Lemma 3. The growth rate, g, is hump-shaped in the number of rms if aggregate
R&D is also hump-shaped, but it is not necessarily hump-shaped if aggregate R&D is
everywhere increasing in the number of rms.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.















The lifetime utility of the representative individual as a function of N and the general
















Equation (18) captures three eects through which a decrease in market concentration
aects welfare.17 The rst is a love for variety eect|a larger number of varieties
makes consumers better o. The second is a competition eect, which re
ects the
lower mark-up pricing. Finally, the growth rate determines the increase in the 
ow
utility over time. As the growth rate may be hump-shaped in the number of rms, it
need not be the case that lifetime utility increases with N.
In order to make our own point for welfare improving lobbying, let us assume that



















17In what follows, we use the terms utility and welfare interchangeably where it leads to no
confusion to refer to equation (18).
16A necessary and sucient condition is that the growth eect does not dominate the
love for variety eect and the competition eect for any N. This ensures that the
laissez-faire equilibrium is welfare maximizing for given E. Our results would become
stronger if utility is hump-shaped in N. For future reference, note that an increase in
expenditures aects utility directly, and indirectly through the growth rate.
4 Equilibrium with no lobbying: the benchmark
case
In this section, we fully characterize the equilibrium of the economy under laissez-faire.
Industry equilibrium
With no lobbying and free-entry, the equilibrium number of rms is a jump variable
that satises the free-entry condition at all times.18 In particular, whenever V > 0
there is entry, whereas for V < 0 there is exit. Dierentiating equation (7) with
respect to time and rearranging, we obtain the following perfect foresight no-arbitrage
condition for the equilibrium in the capital market
rV =  + _ V
This equation, together with the free-entry condition, V = 0, implies that instanta-




= Lz(N;E;r) +  (19)
Equation (19) determines the number of rms as a function of aggregate expenditures,
E, and the interest rate, r, with Lz given by (15). Let Nf(E;r) denote the solution












f(E;r)   (20)
18For analytical convenience, the rest of the analysis treats the number of rms as a continuous
variable.
19Consequently, dividends in the consumers budget constraint must also be zero.
17General equilibrium



































Straightforward algebra allows us to write (21) as Ef = 1, and it follows that, in
equilibrium, _ E=E = 0. Finally, using (19) in (15), the expression for (N) and r = ,












  (Nfe   1)
= 
Existence is immediate, since prots are positive for suciently small values of N and
negative for large values. Uniqueness is assured by Assumption 1, since this implies
that prots are negatively related to N, given E and r.
Equilibrium growth and welfare
Finally, equilibrium growth is obtained after replacing N, E and r by their equilibrium
values in (17) . Letting Lf
z = Lz(Nfe;Ef), the equilibrium growth rate in this economy
under laissez-faire becomes
g






















In general, gf does not dene the maximum growth rate. However, the equilibrium
number of rms is welfare maximizing given E. Figure 3 provides a graphical repre-
18sentation for a hump-shaped growth rate.20
Figure 3: Welfare and growth under free-entry: the benchmark case.
For future reference, we state the following result.
Lemma 4. An increase in concentration increases the growth rate above the free-entry
equilibrium, given expenditures, if and only if:
(i) the growth rate is hump-shaped;
(ii) the free-entry equilibrium is on the decreasing part of the growth schedule;
(iii) the decrease in the number of rms is suciently small.
Proof. The rst part of the proof is graphical. If (i), (ii) and (iii) are veried, then
from the left graph of Figure 3, it is clear that a decrease in N increases growth. To
prove the implication on the opposite direction, it is enough to show that if either (i),
(ii) or (iii) are not veried, then growth decreases, which is immediate.
5 Lobbying and the political market
We now turn to the eects of lobbying on market structure, growth, and welfare.
Since the policy-maker is usually perceived as a monopolist over R&D licences, we
assume that he denes market structure directly. As a reference case, let us start
by considering a benevolent policy-maker, who is solely concerned with the utility of
the representative individual ( = 0), but does not take into account how a change
20Since the Lerner Index is more suggestive as a measure of concentration, we use its complement
to plot this and the subsequent graphs.

























taking as given the general equilibrium variables of the economy, E and r.
Since U(N;E;r) is increasing in N, the free-entry condition determines the equi-
librium number of rms. Hence, the benevolent policy-maker does not interfere with
market forces and all the analysis developed previously can be used to characterize
this economy. On the contrary, a perfect foresighted benevolent social planner, who
takes into account the general equilibrium interactions between N and E, may reduce
the number of rms in order to maximize welfare. This situation may occur because
equilibrium expenditures are negatively related to N|a decrease in market size in-
creases prots and therefore dividends. While lobbying may increase welfare above
the free-entry level, a benevolent social planner always achieves the maximum level
of welfare, and lobbying cannot improve upon that situation.
5.1 Industry equilibrium with lobbying
It is instructive to begin our analysis by supposing that E is given. This allows
us to gain some insights which will prove useful in the full-
edged analysis. For a
given market structure, rms behave exactly as in the no-lobby economy in Section 3.
However, the industry equilibrium is not dened by the usual zero-prot condition.
The objective of this section is to present a simple model of lobbying where the lobby
and the policy-maker bargain over the number of rms. This process denes the
industry equilibrium, given the general equilibrium variables E and r.
More specically, our focus lies on an ecient bargaining, which makes all players
(weakly) better o as compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium. Consider that rms
get organized in a lobby, whose objective is to maximize the joint surplus of its
members, and let (N;E;r) denote aggregate prots before contributions. Since one
21Implicit in this specication is the assumption that the general equilibrium eects of policy
actions may be dicult to perceive and take into account in decision making. Thus, we consider that
a benevolent policy-maker is not a benevolent social-planner, since he lacks some of the instruments
that would be available to the latter.
20unit of LQ allows rms to produce one good, which is then used to lobby the policy-
maker, LQ corresponds to the average in-kind transfers made to the policy-maker.
Hence NLQ = 	, and22







Then, the individual rationality constraints for the policy-maker and the lobby are,
respectively
IR
















where we have used the fact that prots are 0 in an equilibrium with free-entry. In












This condition states that a successful bargaining is only feasible if the policy-maker is
largely concerned with political contributions relative to social welfare. Since, due to
Assumption 1, aggregate prots are decreasing in N, the IR
F constraint implies that
market concentration must increase as a result of lobbying. Note that the expected
benet from participating in the lobby is positive for any rm, since exit from the
market has the same economic value of the free-entry outcome. Hence, lobbying makes







22We do not provide a theory of lobbying formation here. We simply assume that rms are able
to overcome their rivalry and get organized in order to improve their bargaining power, ignoring
any issues that might be induced by the possibility of free-riding. One can think that rms not
represented in the lobby cannot obtain licences from the policy-maker or face greater diculties in
obtaining these licences, due to a lack of bargaining power.
21The utility possibilities frontier is given by the solution of the following problem
max
	;N







s:t: (N;E;r)   	 = 
(N;E;r)  0
which states that agents will negotiate a market structure such that each surviving
rm is left with a prot of =N > 0. Plugging in the rst constraint into the objective
function and dening 0 = (1   ) 1 as the relative weight of political contributions











s:t: N 2 [1;N
fe]
(22)
Note that the objective function of problem (22) corresponds to (8) when written
in terms of N, E and r. Let Upol(N;E;r) denote this function. In the subsequent
analysis, we assume that Upol(N;E;r) is strictly quasiconcave in N, so that the rst-
order condition below is sucient to characterize the equilibrium market structure,
given E and r. In Appendix B we use numerical simulations to take into account the
possible existence of multiple local maxima in problem (22). The rst-order condition
















where Np = Np(;E;r) denes the negotiated market structure as a function of the
political weight given to contributions, , expenditures, E, and the interest rate, r.
It states that the policy-maker restricts the number of rms until the marginal cost
in individual utility matches the marginal gain from contributions. Given E and r,
both players walk out of the bargain better o, at the expense of households. We can
therefore put forward the following result.
Proposition 1. When expenditures are given, lobbying
(i) increases market concentration;
(ii) may raise the growth rate;
22(iii) reduces household utility;
when compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Proof. Part (i) follows directly from the discussion above. Since individual welfare is
increasing in N given E, (i) immediately implies (iii). As regards to part (ii) note
that growth increases if and only if the 3 conditions stated in Lemma 4 are satised:
the growth rate is hump-shaped in N, the free-entry equilibrium is on the decreasing
part of the growth schedule, and the decrease in N is suciently small. This latter
condition is satised if  is suciently small.
This result is illustrated in Figure 4, for the case of a hump-shaped growth rate.
Lobbying may foster growth relative to the perfect foresight general equilibrium under
laissez-faire, since a higher concentration increases the total amount of gross prots
in the market that can be disputed through quality based R&D. However, consumers
have a lower number of varieties and face a higher price level, which lead to a decrease
in utility, despite the higher growth rate. If growth decreases, then these three eects









































Figure 4: The eect of lobbying on growth and welfare, partial equilibrium (E = 1, r = ).
Regardless of the shape of the growth rate, a large preference for contributions
generates an excessively concentrated market, in which there are little or no incentives
to invest in product innovation. In the limit, a completely voracious policy-maker
( = 1) sets Np = 1|with a sole active rm in the market, there are no incentives to
innovate, and the growth rate comes down to zero. To see this, start by observing that
prots are maximal in a monopolistic market. Hence, through (23), as  approaches
1, Np also converges to 1, and it follows that the growth rate (17) yields a corner
solution at 0.


















The intuition is that a higher  makes contributions more important to the policy-
maker, who will therefore increase concentration in the industry. The relationship
between Np and E is unclear.
5.2 Letting E vary: the full-
edged analysis
5.2.1 Labor market clearing
We now reintroduce the labor market clearing condition and the rst-order condition
from the consumer's intertemporal maximization problem. When bargaining, the
policy-maker and the lobby take the level of expenditures as given. However, any
shift in concentration changes individual decisions undertaken by rms, creating a
disequilibrium in the labor market that needs to be corrected through an adjustment
in per capita expenditures. In turn, as expenditures jump to a new level, the number
of rms that results from the political process must also change, since the marginal
incentives summarized in (23) are shifted with E. This story implies that, in a steady-
state with lobbying and fully rational players, the equilibrium market structure must





















Equation (24) states that, in the full-
edged equilibrium, given equilibrium expen-
ditures Ep, the policy-maker restricts the number of rms to Npe = Np(;Ep;),
and given that there are Npe rms in the market, equilibrium expenditures are Ep.
Hence, Ep is a xed point of (24). Note that, since expenditures are a jump variable,
it follows that r = .
Unlike the free-entry case, equation (24) may not dene a unique equilibrium.
Observe that an increase in E presents two opposing eects over labor demand: a
direct eect, due to an expansion in production and innovation, and an indirect eect,
due to a change in the number of rms. Since these eects may work in opposite
directions for dierent levels of expenditures, labor demand may not be monotonic in
E. Additionally, the existence of a xed point is also not assured. In Appendix B we
24use numerical simulations to analyze these issues in greater detail. Here, we assume























The expression between brackets is positive, since labor demand, LD, can be written as
LD = E +	 (N;E;r), and hence @LD=@N =  @=@N > 0. Using the expression








  N   (N;E;r) (25)
Let p = (Npe;Ep;). Plugging (25) in the labor market clearing condition, using
the equilibrium market structure and the fact that r = , we obtain Ep = 1+p 	.
Since, by the IR
F constraint, p  	, we must have Ep  1. The intuition for this
result works as follows. Lobbying originates a decrease in the number of rms as
compared to free-entry, allowing them to achieve a positive level of prots. Part of
these prots (	) is given to the policy-maker as contributions, while the remaining
(p   	) is distributed as dividends to consumers. Expenditures are higher because
the income of consumers has increased, by the amount p   	.24
Finally, note that the composition of labor demand has changed. In particular, if
aggregate R&D is hump-shaped, the free-entry equilibrium is on the decreasing part
of the R&D schedule, and  is not large, then Lz must increase. Since labor supply is
constant, the labor applied in production must be lower. In any other case, Lz would
be positively aected by the increase in E, but negatively aected by the fall in N,
and the nal balance is unclear.
5.2.2 Steady-state contributions and asymmetric Nash bargaining
The ecient bargain determines the number of rms that maximizes the joint surplus
of the policy-maker and the lobby. Here, we analyze the distribution of surplus in
23Despite this, the results provided in this subsection are also applicable for the case of multiple
equilibria.
24Note that this is dierent than saying that consumers are able to aord more goods. An increase
in concentration also raises the price they have to pay for each good.
25order to determine the change in growth and welfare.
The total amount of surplus generated by the bargain is simply the increase in
aggregate prots before contributions. Consider that this surplus is distributed ac-
cording to an asymmetric Nash bargaining (Binmore et al., 1986). Hence,
D = 
p   	 = 
p
and
	 = (1   )
p (26)
where  is the share of surplus obtained by the lobby. It remains to determine the
range of admissible values for . Using the IR
P constraint, we can establish the
minimum necessary compensation that must be given to the policy-maker such that
he accepts a change in the market structure





The policy-maker may not be reimbursed in equilibrium, since, as we show below,

















denote equilibrium R&D. Equilibrium growth and welfare
are, respectively
g
























5.3 Lobbying, growth, and welfare
The following result analyzes the eects of lobbying in our economy.
Proposition 2. Assume an equilibrium with lobbying exists, and that labor demand
is increasing in expenditures. Then, in the full-
edged equilibrium, lobbying
26(i) increases market concentration;
(ii) may increase the growth rate;
(iii) may increase household utility if  is suciently high;
when compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Proof. Part (i) follows directly from the bargain and the labor market clearing con-
dition. Note that, if Npe > Nfe, then Ep < 1, and prots would be negative in an





























The rst term is the change in the growth rate due to the fall in the number of rms,
and the last term is the direct eect of E on g. Consider that the growth rate is
hump-shaped in N, the free-entry equilibrium is on the decreasing part of the growth
schedule, and  is not large. Then, from Proposition 1 and using (i) we immediately
obtain that the sign of the rst term is positive. Since @g=@E > 0, growth increases
in the full-
edged equilibrium. If at least one of these conditions is not satised, then
we immediately obtain that the sign of the rst term is negative and the nal eect




























Since utility is increasing in N, (i) implies that the sign of the rst term is negative.
Since @U=@E > 0, utility increases if the latter term dominates the former. Since,
using (26), equilibrium expenditures can be written as Ep = 1 + p, this can only
occur for suciently high values of .
On the overall, we identify three classes of eects: the partial equilibrium eect, for
E given, the general equilibrium eect of a change in the number of rms due to the









































Note additionally that we can combine the rst two classes of eects with the love for
variety eect, the competition eect, and the growth-N eect. Since E aects utility
directly and indirectly through the growth rate, we can divide the latter class in a



















 | {z }
Expenditure
This information is summarized in Table 1. Note that it is not the shift in the number
of rms that may drive the increase in welfare, but a higher E. Lobbying leads
some rms to leave the market, therefore increasing concentration and reducing labor
demand, given expenditures|this generates the partial equilibrium eects analyzed
before. In the general equilibrium, labor market clearing requires an increase in E.
Since the number of rms responds endogenously to this adjustment, concentration
in the market changes, but the direction of this change depends on @Np=@E, and so
its eects are undetermined. However, the combined outcome of these two classes
of eects on welfare is negative, as Npe < Nfe. Finally, the increase in the size of
demand fosters economic growth and enlarges the number of goods consumers can
buy for the same number of rms. Welfare increases if the positive eect of E on
utility dominates the negative eect of N. Since Ep = 1+p, this can only occur if
the real costs of lobbying are small, i.e. if the share of dividends on total prots before
contributions () is suciently high. Figure 5 illustrates the result when growth and
welfare increase, for @Np=@E < 0 suciently high .
5.4 The ineciency of the free-entry equilibrium
If lobbying may improve welfare upon the laissez-faire equilibrium, then free-entry
must be associated with some type of market failure. With free-entry, an entrant
rm does not take into account its impact on the prots of incumbent rms. Since
28Table 1: The impact of lobbying on welfare: decomposition of eects.
Number of rms (N) Expenditures (E)
Eects Variety Compet. Growth-N Growth-E Expendit. Welfare
Partial Eq.     +=   
General Eq. ? ? ? ?
+ + +
Welfare     +=  + + ?
The Growth-N eect is positive if the growth rate is hump-shaped in N, the free-entry equilibrium
is on the decreasing part of the growth schedule, and  is not large. Otherwise, the Growth-N eect
is negative. These eects go in the same direction of the partial equilibrium if @Np=@E < 0, and

















































Figure 5: The eect of lobbying on growth and welfare, general equilibrium.
entry leads to a decrease in the demand faced by each rm, directly through N and
indirectly through a fall in E, the value of one unit of R&D may decrease for N
large, inducing rms to revise downwards their investments. Hence, the laissez-faire
equilibrium may be characterized by excess entry, as excess competition resiliently
hampers growth.25 This adjustment, together with a fall in consumer's income, may
overcome the usual gains from competition|lower mark-ups and more variety.
By taking into account total contributions, the policy-maker is indirectly inter-
nalizing the R&D externality caused by excess entry. If the fraction of surplus the
society has to pay to the policy-maker is suciently small, the economy may achieve a
higher growth path, which, together with the expansion in households income, boosts
welfare. In this sense, lobbying acts much like a patent, increasing the appropriation
of returns from R&D.
25The idea that a decentralized economy may undertake too little R&D has already been separately
explored in the literature in dierent contexts (see, for instance, Jones and Williams, 2000 and
de Groot and Nahuis, 2002).
296 A calibration exercise
In this section, we calibrate the model for the U.S. economy. In order to undertake
this exercise, we consider a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
ow utility, so that
we can take into account a signicant branch of the literature which suggests that the
elasticity of marginal utility is greater than unity.
6.1 Extending the model: the CRRA specication







 ( t)d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The demand schedules are the same as before, as well as the characterization of the
goods market and the growth function. The partial equilibrium is also as before,
except that, in the case of lobbying, the policy-maker's utility function takes into









(1   )g(N;E;r)   
Free-entry
With free-entry, the labor market clearing condition still implies an equilibrium value
for expenditures of unity. Since PC is a quality weighted price index, it evolves over
time according to the symmetric of the growth rate, i.e. _ PC=PC =  g(N;E;r).
Intuitively, goods are becoming cheaper over time as compared to the services they
provide, and hence the price of the consumption basket must be falling at the rate
quality is increasing. Combining this with (28), and using Ef = 1, the equilibrium
interest rate, rf, is the xed point of the following equation
r






30Some numerical exercises show that existence is not always assured, but for the cal-
ibrated parameters the issue of non-existence does not arise. Using the equilibrium
values for r and E, we can immediately obtain the equilibrium market structure,
growth, and welfare.
Lobbying




































Again, existence and uniqueness are not guaranteed, but, if an equilibrium exists,
it is numerically possible to recover the equilibrium values for expenditures and the
interest rate, and subsequently the equilibrium number of rms, growth and welfare.
Steady-state contributions are determined as in Section 5.
6.2 Calibration of the model
Several parameters in our model have close real-world counterparts and so they can
be calibrated directly from the data. For this purpose, we follow related studies of
numerical R&D models. Others, however, require a more indirect approach. Since
lobbying and campaign contributions comprehend billions of dollars every year, we
take our benchmark calibration to be representative of an outcome with lobbying.
Thereafter, we proceed backwards, identifying what would be the outcome with no
lobbying. Finally, we compare the long-run economic performance between both sit-
uations.
Matched empirical facts
We calibrate the model such that the equilibrium interest and growth rates match
the U.S. empirical data. This implies that some parameters of the model must be
calibrated internally. The long-term interest rate (rp) is set to 7 percent, which is
the estimated average real rate of return on the stock market over the past century
31(Mehra and Prescott, 1985, Jones and Williams, 2000).26 The growth rate (gp) is set
to 2.1 percent, which is the estimated growth rate of consumption per capita for the
post-war period, as reported in Comin (2004). This value is also comprised within the
GDP per capita growth rates reported in the literature for the same period of time,
which range from 1.7 to 2.3 percent, depending on the data source and on the time
span considered. We admit a range of values for the R&D employment intensity (Lp
z)
between 12 and 15 percent, consistent with the data provided by the National Science
Foundation for high-intensity R&D sectors.27
A typical calibration
In accordance with the literature (e.g. Strulik, 2007, Funke and Strulik, 2000), we
set the benchmark value for the elasticity of marginal utility () to 2. According to
condition (29), this implies an intertemporal discount factor of 0.049.
Contrary to most models of endogenous growth that consider the case of monop-
olistic competition, the elasticity of demand in our model depends on the equilibrium
number of rms, and so the elasticity of substitution between two dierent varieties
(") cannot be directly obtained through empirical estimates of the mark-up pricing.
Therefore, we set a reasonable value for ", and require, ex-post, that the equilibrium
mark-up is comprised within an acceptable range; otherwise we re-calibrate the value
of ". The literature is not unanimous as regards to the mark-up, providing dierent
values depending on the type of products considered. Some empirical estimates sug-
gest lower values for the mark-up, ranging up to 40 percent (e.g. Basu, 1996), while
others hint slightly higher values, which can exceed 70 percent (e.g. Roeger, 1995,
Funke and Strulik, 2000). Consistent with this, we dene an acceptable range for p,
1:4  p  1:6. After some trial and error, we found that a value of " = 6 performs
quite well, frequently providing a price level within this interval.
Another parameter which has to be recovered through a similar method is the
quantity of labor associated to overhead expenditures per rm (), since only the total
amount, Npe, can be retrieved from the data. Depending on whether one classies
the costs of certain activities as xed or variable, and on the time span considered,
the labor allocated to overhead activities in the manufacturing sector ranges from 10
26As Jones and Williams (2000) note, since the interest rate in R&D driven models is also the rate
of return to R&D, it cannot be calibrated to the risk-free rate on T-bills.
27Since our model represents a R&D economy, it is natural to consider statistics of R&D-intensive
industries to determine the R&D employment intensity.
32Table 2: Parameter values used in calibration.
Parameter Value
Interest rate rp 0.07
Growth rate gp 0.021
Marginal elasticity of substitution  2
Elasticity of substitution between varieties " 0.6
Spillovers 
 0.7
Quality-R&D elasticity  0.18
Fixed cost  0.07
Discount factor  0.049
to 20 percent of total labor, according to the statistical database of the International
Labor Organization. Consistent with this, we set  at 0.07, which yields a value for
Npe within this range.
Retrieving 
,  and 
The elasticity of quality with respect to R&D (), the level of spillovers (
), and
the preference for contributions () have to be calibrated simultaneously. The rst
two parameters are pre-determined, while  is set so that equilibrium growth is 2.1
percent. The acceptable range for  lies between 0.15 and 0.20|for values above
this interval it is not possible to match the empirical growth rate for any , while
values below this interval do not replicate U.S. empirical facts on R&D, regardless of
spillovers. Given this range for , we can numerically nd a lower bound for 
 as a
function of , 
(), with 
0() > 0, above which the labor allocated to R&D is within
the specied interval. For our benchmark, we set  = 0:18 and 
 = 0:7, which is
compatible with a R&D labor share around 13.5 percent. Table 2 summarizes our
benchmark calibration.
6.3 Results
The results are summarized in Table 3 and in Figure 6, for the case in which the
policy-maker receives no contributions ( = 1).28 For the calibrated model, we es-
timate a free-entry growth rate of 1.73 percent, almost 0.4 percentage points below
the empirical value. This outcome is mainly motivated by the 2 percentage points
dierence in labor allocated to R&D between the two situations. With lobbying,
28Since welfare increases, the policy-maker may not receive any contributions in equilibrium.
33industry prots represent about 5 percent of the total income of workers.29 When
compared to free-entry, concentration is slightly larger, as well as the mark-up. Ad-
ditionally, lobbying presents a welfare gain of 3.5 percent in consumption equivalent
terms, sustained through lower consumption at time 0, but higher consumption later
on. These results are qualitatively robust to every suitable sensitivity analysis that
we undertook.
Table 3: Calibration results for the case in which the policy-maker receives no contributions in
equilibrium.
Parameter Lobbying Free-entry
Preference for contributions  0.444 |{
Expenditures E 1.052 1.000
Wage w 1.000 1.000
Dividends D 0.052 |{
Contributions 	 0.000 |{
1 - Lerner Index 0.698 0.731
Mark-up p   1 0.433 0.367
R&D labor share Lz 0.136 0.115
Share of labor used in production N  LX 0.865 0.885
Share of variable costs N  X 0.734 0.731
Share of xed costs N   0.130 0.154
Interest rate r 0.070 0.066
Growth rate g 0.021 0.017
Utility gain (%) 2.48 |{
Consumption equivalent gain (%) 3.5 |{
Consumption gain at t (%) -2.96 |{
Consumption gain after 10 years (%) 0.78 |{
Consumption gain after 25 years (%) 6.53 |{
Consumption gain after 50 years (%) 16.83 |{
In the most natural case, however, a fraction of surplus should be allocated to the
policy-maker. Table 4 and Figure 7 present the results for a case in which the policy-
maker gets 30 percent of the surplus generated by the bargain. The Lerner Index
and R&D labor intensity are now slightly lower and the mark-up slightly higher as
compared to the previous results. The values for the interest rate and growth rate are
the same and thus we omit them from the table. However, in this case, there are no
gains from lobbying|the lower level of expenditures is enough to oset all the gains
from lobbying that we just described and presented in Table 3. This outcome is due
29The projected ratio of prots to total wages can be seen as conservative, since this ratio system-
atically exceeds this value for the U.S. economy.

























































Figure 6: Calibration results for the case in which the policy-maker receives no contributions in
equilibrium.
to the real costs of lobbying|about 1.8 percent of wages|which cannot be used in
production or R&D activities.

























































Figure 7: Calibration results for a case in which the policy-maker receives positive contributions in
equilibrium.
7 Concluding remarks and discussion
This paper analyzes the link between lobbying, market structure, growth, and wel-
fare, in a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth. The interaction between
policy-makers and lobbyists rms is explicitly modeled and a special focus is given to
the impact of lobbying on the determinants of welfare. We conclude that lobbying,
35Table 4: Calibration results for a case in which the policy-maker receives positive contributions in
equilibrium.
Parameter Lobbying Free-entry
Distribution of surplus (fraction)
Firms (households)  0.700 |{
Policy-maker 1    0.300 |{
Preference for contributions  0.465 |{
Expenditures E 1.042 1.000
Wage w 1.000 1.000
Dividends D 0.042 |{
Contributions 	 0.018 |{
1 - Lerner Index 0.691 0.731
Mark-up p   1 0.447 0.367
R&D labor share Lz 0.135 0.115
Share of labor used in production N  LX 0.847 0.885
Share of variable costs N  X 0.720 0.731
Share of xed costs N   0.127 0.154
Utility gain (%) 0.00 |{
Consumption equivalent gain (%) 0.00 |{
Consumption gain at t (%) -5.22 |{
Consumption gain after 10 years (%) -1.65 |{
Consumption gain after 25 years (%) 3.96 |{
Consumption gain after 50 years (%) 14.02 |{
by increasing prots, generates extra income to households|dividends|increasing
the size of aggregate demand. Besides the direct impact on consumers' welfare, the
increase in aggregate demand may raise rms' incentives to invest in R&D, since the
market size they can capture becomes larger. These adjustments balance against the
negative eects of a reduction in the number of varieties, the increase in the mark-up
pricing, and contributions. We conclude that the answer to the question posed in
the title is positive: lobbying may in fact increase welfare, as long as the real cost of
lobbying is low.
This paper is build under a set of standard assumptions. We use the endogenous
growth model of Peretto (1996), since it establishes a link between market structure
and innovation. Although it would be interesting to study the eects of lobbying in
a more general context and in dierent types of models, our framework provides a
simple and tractable analysis, emphasizing the mechanisms through which lobbying
may aect growth and welfare. Lobbying is introduced through a standard framework,
which does not explain how policy-platforms are chosen, but captures the outcome
of those policy-platforms. While a complete setup would be desirable, this shortcut
36allows us to focus on the essencial, which is the role of lobbying on economic growth
and welfare.
In the political market, rms make contributions to the policy-maker. Since there
is no money in our economy, these are in-kind contributions, which require real re-
sources to be produced. Hence, although in our model there is no corruption, time-
consuming red tape, or other administrative hurdles needed to start operating a busi-
ness (which, as Djankov et al., 2002 point out, are very important in reality), there is
still a real cost of lobbying. We also consider that a policy-maker who does not care
about contributions does not change the free-entry equilibrium, although that change
could have a positive impact on welfare in the general equilibrium. One possible in-
terpretation is that the policy-maker is not aware of the eects of his actions on the
general equilibrium. Hence, lobbying is presented as a way to create the necessary
incentives for market intervention, at a cost. If we had considered the opposite, i.e.,
a policy-maker who understands that he can change the general equilibrium, then
he would select the welfare maximizing allocation, and lobbying would always result
in lower welfare. Finally, we do not address the stability of collective action. If the
economy with lobbying experiences a parameter change and the number of rms in
equilibrium decreases, no rm would want to exit the market voluntarily, since it
is making positive prots. While this may destroy collective action, the problem is
mitigated if one considers some redistributive mechanism within the lobby, such that
those rms who exit the market are compensated.
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41Appendices
A Proof of Lemmas 1 to 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We divide the proof in 3 steps. We rst show that @Lz=@N > 0 for small N. Next,
we show that limN!1 @Lz=@N converges to 0. Finally, we prove that @Lz=@N < 0

































































limN!+1(N   1)2 = 0
where we have used the l'H^ opital's rule. Showing that @Lz@N < 0 for large N is
equivalent to show that
("   1)E(N   1)
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42where the inequality arises from the fact that Lz > 0.



















It is straightforward to show that limN!1 @Lz=@N = +1 and limN!+1 @Lz=@N = 0.
Equation (32) takes a negative sign when
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2
Since (N   1)2=
 
N"   ("   1)
2 is increasing in N and varies between 0 and 1="2, Lz
is decreasing in the number of rms for large N if and only if




Otherwise, Lz is increasing in N.

















Using Lemma 2, it is straightforward to see that @g=@N is positive for small values
of N and negative for larger values if Lz is hump-shaped in N. If Lz is increasing in
N, then the shape of the growth rate depends on the magnitude of @Lz=@N in (33).
43B Additional insights on the full-
edged equilib-
rium
Here, we use numerical simulations to analyze the full-
edged equilibrium when Upol
is not quasiconcave and labor demand is not monotonic or continuous in E. Observe
that Upol depends on the balance of households utility and overall prots, and there
is no reason why this balance should be monotonic in the number of rms. Our
numerical results suggest that, in this case, problem (22) may have up to two local
maxima. Since a shift in the parameters of the problem may change the location of the
global maximum, Np(;E;r) may no longer be continuous in  and E. Consequently,
labor demand in (24) does not need to be continuous, and this in
uences the number
of equilibria. Furthermore, for large values of , an equilibrium may not exist. We
analyze the issues of multiplicity and non-existence separately.
Steady-state multiplicity
The number of equilibriums in this economy is determined by the number of values of
E that satisfy the labor market clearing condition in (24). Since labor demand does
not need to be monotonically increasing in per capita expenditures, nor continuous,
dierent values of E may lead to the same quantity of labor demanded by rms. Our
numerical results suggest that the economy may have up to three distinct equilibria.
The case of two equilibria. A situation with two equilibria may arise if labor
demand is not continuous in per capita expenditures, which, in turn, requires that
Np(;E;) is not continuous in E. In this case, as E is pushed upwards, gross-
prots increase, but they tend to increase by a larger amount for higher levels of
concentration. The policy-maker then discretely reduces the number of rms to a
nearly monopolistic market. Hence, there exists a critical level of expenditures where
the indirect eect of a fall in the number of rms predominates, and labor demand falls
discontinuously at that point, but tends to be increasing in E thereafter. Therefore,
the equilibrium condition in the labor market can be satised for, at most, two distinct
levels of expenditures.
44The case of three equilibria. A situation with three equilibria may arise if Np is
continuous, but @Np=@E is negative and very large in absolute terms. In this case, the
fall in labor demand due to N overcomes the direct eect of per capita expenditures on
LD, at least for a small region of E. As Np quickly converges to its lower bound, the
eect of N on LD dissipates, and only the eect of E remains. Hence, labor demand
in the general equilibrium can present at most one region where it is decreasing in E,
which implies that we may have, at most, three xed points in equation (24).
Figure 8: The labor market: multiple equilibria.
These two cases are illustrated Figure 8. The existence multiple equilibria leads
to the crucial question of how the economy selects between them. Since N is a
jump variable, all equilibria are feasible, and the selection between them depends
exclusively on agents expectations about future entry, exit, price, investment and
political contributions. However, none of these equilibria is predominantly superior
in terms of welfare, i.e., there does not exist one equilibrium that systematically
dominates the others, or that systematically dominates free-entry. Hence, all the
analysis developed previously can be extended to contemplate the current cases, as
long as one considers the equilibrium represented therein as one of the possible three
equilibria that may exist in the model.
Non-existence
The existence of an equilibrium in the labor market is not assured for large values of
, since total labor demanded by rms may not suce to attain full employment, no
matter the level of expenditures. To understand this, consider @Np=@E < 0 and recall
45that, as E increases to correct disequilibriums in the labor market, the incentives of
the policy-maker may change towards a reduction in N, which pushes aggregate labor
demand in the opposite direction. If  is large enough, then the market structure
converges to the monopolistic case at a rate which may be sucient to induce an
excess labor supply for all values of per capita expenditures, as illustrated in Figure
9. In such situation, aggregate R&D approaches zero (as the maximization condition
of rms originates a corner solution at Lz = 0), and so does total sales (as the price
level converges to innity), and therefore it follows that total labor demand converges
to  for nite E. A corollary of this is that there exists no general equilibrium with
































Figure 9: The labor market: non-existence of general equilibrium.
Finally, note that it is always possible to nd an upper bound for  below which
an equilibrium is dened. Our equilibrium analysis in the main text assumed such
condition, so that no non-existence problems arose.
46